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ABSTRACT 
The definition of statutory subject matter lies at the heart of the 
patent system. It is the reflection of Congress's policy decision as to 
what types of inventions one may patent. While the congressional 
definition of statutory subject matter (in what is now 35 U.S.C. § 101) 
has remained fundamentally constant since 1790, the Supreme Court 
has reinterpreted and redefined statutory subject matter several times, 
leaving lower courts with the frustrating task of trying to develop a 
coherent jurisprudence against a changing landscape. This 
inconstancy has introduced uncertainty for inventors who are trying to 
make the fundamental decision of whether to maintain a trade secret 
or seek patent protection for an innovation. Notwithstanding repeated 
admonitions to the lower courts not to read words into the patent 
statute, the Supreme Court itself has created three exceptions to the 
categories of statutory subject matter established by the clear words of 
§ 101: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. This 
intervention would be defensible if it were constitutionally required or 
if the statutory language were ambiguous, but neither is the case. In 
fact, the Court's particular intervention is counter to the constitutional 
mandate to promote progress. In certain cases, this disincentive may 
be sufficient to prevent promising new technologies from ever 
developing. This Article proposes that Congress should consider the 
judicially created exceptions to the statutory categories of patentable 
subject matter and amend the statute so as to end judicial intrusion 
into patent policy making. 
© 2012 Max Stu/ Oppenheimer. B.S. cum laude, Princeton University; J.D., Harvard 
Law School; Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law; Faculty, The Johns Hopkins 
University Carey School of Business. Thanks to Kimberly Attardo, UB 2012, for her assistance in 
the preparation of this article. 
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Congress has just completed a major overhaul of the US patent 
statute, reversing the fundamental definition of inventorship that 
dated back to 1790, but leaving in place a provision that nearly 
prevented the emergence of the computer and biotech industries, and 
that threatens the future of emerging technologies such as 
nanotechnology. 1 The scope of "statutory subject matter" has eluded 
1. See Leahy·Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
("[Clonverting the United States patent system from 'first to invent' to a system of 'first inventor 
to file' .... ") (amending 35 U.S.C. § 100(0) (2006»; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
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definition. 2 While the language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 has remained 
fundamentally constant since 1790, the Supreme Court has 
reinterpreted and redefined it several times since the Court's first 
foray into the subject in 1853.3 This judicial inconstancy has left lower 
courts with the frustrating task of trying to develop a coherent 
jurisprudence against a changing landscape. Furthermore, this 
inconstancy has introduced uncertainty for inventors who are trying 
to make the fundamental decision of whether to maintain a trade 
secret or seek patent protection4 for an innovation.5 
The current patent statute conditions the grant of a patent on 
meeting several criteria. An applicant must file a written application 
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),6 which 
reviews the application7 to determine whether the claimed inventions: 
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 lists four categories of "statutory subject matter" that may be 
patented: machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, and processes. 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(2006). These are the only types of inventions that may be patented. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[Njo patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, 
and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 .... "). 
3. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185. 
4. See id. There are three types of patents-utility patents granted for new and useful 
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, 35 U.S.C. §101; design patents 
granted for novel ornamental designs, 35 U.S.C. § 171; and plant patents granted for distinct and 
new varieties of plants (other than tubers) that have been asexually reproduced, 35 U.S.C. § 16l. 
The issues discussed in this article arise only with respect to utility patents. 
5. See id.; Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-90 (comparing the protection afforded by trade 
secret and patent systems). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as: 
[I]nformation ... that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy. 
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985). Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 
misappropriation of trade secrets-generally, disclosure or use of a trade secret that has been 
obtained from the owner by improper means-gives rise to damages and the possibility of 
injunctive relief. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2), §§ 2-3 (1985). Under the patent system, 
manufacture, use, sale, or importation of a product incorporating a patented invention-whether 
obtained from the owner or independently developed-gives rise to damages and the possibility 
of injunctive relief. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-84 (2006). Thus, the patent system may be viewed as a 
mechanism for inducing the holders of trade secrets to disclose them (and therefore surrender 
protection under trade secret law) in exchange for a limited-term, but broader scope, monopoly 
over certain applications of the trade secrets. See Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 489-90; Painton & Co. v. 
Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). 
6. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). 
7. Id. § 13l. 
8. A patent application must contain at least one claim that defines "the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention." Id. § 112. 
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(1) is statutory subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or process;9 
(2) is useful; 10 
(3) is novel; 11 
(4) would not be considered obvious by a hypothetical person of 
ordinary skill in the field;12 and 
(5) is described well enough that those in the field can make 
and use the invention.13 
The USPTO will issue a patent only for claims it determines 
satisfy the statutory requirements, and a challenge to an issued 
patent will succeed if the challenger can show that any of these 
requirements have not been met. 14 A court faced with a patent 
challenge can invalidate a patent on any of the above grounds. 
The definition of statutory subject matter lies at the heart of 
the patent system. It is the reflection of Congress's policy decision as 
to what types of inventions one may patent. The Supreme Court has 
held Congress's power plenary,15 and this policy decision is given great 
judicial deference. Indeed, as the name implies, it is "statutory."16 
Notwithstanding repeated admonitions to the lower courts not 
to read words into the patent statute,17 the Court itself has created 
three exceptions to the categories of statutory subject matter 
established by the clear words of § 101: laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas. 18 Those three exceptions are the root 
cause of the difficulties in defining the scope of statutory subject 
matter and arguably have delayed the development of the software, 
9. Id. § 101; see also supra note 2. 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Patent Office interprets § 101 to require that the claimed 
invention have a "specific, substantial, and credible" use. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107(11) (8th ed. Rev. 8, 2010). 
11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102. 
12_ Id. § 103. 
13. Id. § 112. 
14. Id. §§ 101, 131, 151, 282. 
15. See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) ("[T]he powers of Congress to 
legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution .... "). For two 
copyright cases confirming the scope of Congress's power under the Intellectual Property Clause, 
which governs both patents and copyrights, see Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (upholding 
a statute restoring copyrights to works which had fallen into the public domain) and Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 101; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). 
17. The Supreme Court has "more than once cautioned that courts should not read into 
the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed." Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (citations omitted). 
18. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
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biotech, and nanotechnology industries. 19 This intervention would be 
defensible if it were constitutionally required, but that is not the case. 
In fact, the Court's particular intervention is counter to the 
constitutional mandate to promote progress; withdrawing patent 
protection withdraws the incentive to disclose. The net result of the 
Court's efforts to circumscribe patentable subject matter is to deprive 
inventors of patents they deserve, and to invite infringement of what 
should be valid patents, thereby providing a disincentive to invent. In 
certain cases, this disincentive may be sufficient to prevent promising 
new technologies from ever developing. The Court has neither cited 
evidence nor offered a rationale for concluding that what it perceives 
as the cost of overly-broad protection outweighs the cost of losing a 
technology entirely. 
This Article proposes that Congress should consider the 
judicially created exceptions to the statutory categories of patentable 
subject matter and revise the statutory definition. Part I traces the 
history of the statutory language and judicial interpretation, showing 
constancy in the statute but the lack of a consistent judicial theory 
supporting the exceptions. Part II examines the arguments 
conceptually justifying limits on statutory subject matter. Part III 
examines the two possible bases for judicial intervention: intervention 
based on constitutional mandate and intervention based on 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Concluding that intervention 
is not constitutionally mandated and the statute is unambiguous, 
Part IV reviews the costs and benefits of maintaining the uncertainty 
resulting from the judicially created exceptions, and Part V proposes 
that Congress amend the statute so as to end judicial intrusion into 
patent policymaking. 
1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER 
A. Why Statutory Subject Matter? 
Given the difficulties and uncertainty surrounding statutory 
subject matter, it is reasonable to ask why the requirement exists in 
the first place. Why should only certain types of discoveries be 
patentable? A simplistic, although sufficient, answer is ''because 
Congress decided to impose it and the Constitution gave Congress that 
power." The Supreme Court has consistently held that "the power of 
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the 
terms of the Constitution, and... there are no restraints on its 
19. Joshua Sarnoff, Patent·Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, 63 
HASTINGS L.J. 53, 59·60 (2011). 
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exercise."20 Courts have been extremely deferential to the terms that 
Congress sets.21 
To understand why Congress might limit patent protection to 
certain categories of invention, a brief review of the origins and an 
overview of the rules of patents will be helpful. 
Patents are government-sanctioned monopolies.22 While early 
English patents were awarded as royal favors,23 the US patent system 
finds antecedents in the English Statute of Monopolies of 1624,24 
which was Parliament's reaction to the royal favor system.25 Modern 
patent systems grant monopolies for "things which are worth to the 
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent."26 
Thus, an optimal patent system would grant patents for 
innovations in a manner that generates maximum scientific progress. 
Unfortunately, it would be impossible to reach universal agreement on 
which system would fit that model of optimality;27 fortunately, the US 
Constitution does not require optimality. Article I, Section 8 
establishes the constitutional basis for the US patent system, 
providing that: 
20. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202,206 (1843); Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 67. 
21. Congress has changed the term of patent protection several times, most recently 
changing the term from seventeen years from the date of issue to twenty years from the date of 
application, see 35 U.S.C. § 154, and no challenge to its authority to do so has ever reached the 
appellate level. In assessing congressional power over copyrights, the other right created by the 
Intellectual Property Clause, the Court held the extension of copyright protection for works 
already in existence constitutional over a vigorous dissent in which Justice Breyer demonstrated 
that the term was nearly unlimited from a discounted cash perspective. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186,256·57 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
22. During its term, a US patent gives its owner the right to stop others from making, 
using, selling, or importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(I). Violation of these 
rights constitutes infringement and gives rise to damages and, subject to equitable 
considerations, injunctions. Id. §§ 283-284. 
23. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 22 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); Edward C. Walterscheid, To 
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12 (1994) (noting that 
the fIrst patent statute was written against the "backdrop" of English monopoly practices). 
24. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 17, 18 (1829). 
25. Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 22 Jac., c. 3, § 6 (Eng.); Walterscheid, supra note 23. 
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former US President, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 
1813) (available at http://hdl.loc.govnoc.mss/mtj.mtjbib020976). 
27. Aaron J. Zakem, Note, Rethinking Patentable Subject Matter: Are Statutory 
Categories Useful?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2983, 2988 (2009) ("[I]t has proven diffIcult to draw an 
exclusionary line which disallows inhibitive patents without prejudicing claims on novel and 
non-obvious technology, where such analysis is based solely on attempts to categorize all 
inventions as either a 'process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter."'). Compare 
Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 57 ("[Tlhe patent system is not supposed to reward discoveries of basic 
science . . . ."), with Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts and Progress in Biomedical 
Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 690·91 (2004) (suggesting that strong patent rights induce 
hypothesis generation and develop new scientific paradigms). 
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The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.28 
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The fundamental goal of the patent system is to provide an 
adequate incentive to motivate innovators to give up trade secret 
rights in their innovation.29 In theory, disclosure of a trade secret 
benefits society more broadly than does maintaining a trade secret 
since it permits more people to make use of the information as a 
starting point for further innovation, thereby opening the door to 
com petition. 30 
Since the patent statute is designed to promote technological 
progress through the incentive of a limited-term monopoly in 
exchange for disclosure of what could otherwise be maintained as a 
trade secret, the choice of requirements for patentability influences 
the type of innovation that the statute promotes. 31 The statute does 
not incentivize categories of inventions that it excludes from 
patentability and therefore inventors are less likely to develop and 
disclose those categories of inventions. The choice is one of policy and 
Congress should make it, subject to constitutional constraints. 
In drafting and revising the patent statute, Congress has 
received little guidance from the records of the Constitutional 
Convention.32 The very existence of the Intellectual Property Clause 
is curious; it is one of the more specific powers in a document 
otherwise given to broad principles. 33 The records of the Convention 
28. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
29. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a "trade secret" as: 
[I]nformation ... that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy. 
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985). Issued patents are published and available at the 
Patent Office, and a full text database is also available online, which is updated weekly. See U. S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., (Sept. 2, 2012, 10:48 PM), www.uspto.gov. Publication of a patent 
destroys the associated trade secrets by two mechanisms: it makes them generally known and it 
is a failure to make reasonable efforts to maintain their secrecy. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 
(amended 1985). 
30. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 483. 
32. For a detailed history of how the clause was drafted and adopted, see Walterscheid, 
supra note 23, at 1·56. See also 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 325, 322 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
33. As Walterscheid points out: 
In the draught of a fundamental constitution, two things deserve attention: 1. To 
insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government should be clogged by 
rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be 
accommodated to times and events .... 2. To use simple and precise language, and 
general propositions .... 
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and the ratification debates are virtually silent on the subject.34 The 
full Convention adopted the Intellectual Property Clause without 
debate and with little record of committee deliberations.35 The patent 
language, in particular, appears to have been added in committee with 
no record of who made the addition or why.36 Guided only by the 
language of the Clause itself, courts have placed few restrictions on 
Congress, the principle restriction being that the patent power is a 
"qualified authority ... limited to the promotion of advances in the 
'useful arts."'37 
The system Congress created provides a delicate balance. The 
patent statute promotes technological progress through the monopoly 
it offers for the creation and disclosure of something new. 38 In 
exchange, the innovator must provide a description of how to make 
and use the invention so that, once the patent expires, the public has 
Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 2. 
34. See generally Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 31·34; cases collected in Max Stul 
Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent 
Harmony?, 40 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445 (2007). 
35. Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the Intellectual 
Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995) ("No delegate to the Constitutional 
Convention has left any record concerning the interpretation or meaning placed on the 
Intellectual Property Clause by the delegates themselves."). 
36. Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 26, 51 ("There is no record to indicate how the 
intellectual property proposals submitted by Madison and Pinckney were transformed into this 
clause."). There are a number of possible explanations for this lack of debate: (1) support for 
patent rights was universal so there was nothing to debate, Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent 
System: The Past is Prologue, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 437, 440 (1980) (''The delegates clearly 
believed firmly that it was in the public interest to establish a patent and copyright system."); (2) 
patents were so unimportant that no one cared, Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 16 ("One 
indication of the relatively low value attached to patents is the fact that no record has been found 
of any litigation involving colonial patents of monopoly for invention in any colonial or English 
court."); and (3) the Convention had more important issues to resolve and limited time: 
The absence of debate over the patent provision ... has been taken as proof of their 
firm belief in patents as the best way to encourage socially beneficial innovation. 
However, it is more likely that the authors of the Constitution simply followed the 
English precedent and chose the patent without paying much attention to the subject, 
since they were also faced with the larger problems of how to structure the 
government, solve its fiscal difficulties, and defend the new nation. 
Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent System, 71 AM. SCI. 
500, 500 (1983). It is also possible "that the delegates were tired [and] wanted to go home .... " 
Walterscheid, supra note 23, at 26, 5l. 
37. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); see also KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (reaffirming that patents are designed to promote "the progress of 
useful arts"); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) 
("[T]he primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners 
of patents, but is 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts .... "'). 
38. 35 U.S.C. § 102 denies patentability to ideas that are already public, while § 103 
denies patentability to obvious advances. §§ 102-103 (2006). "Inventions" must be truly inventive 
and not merely obvious improvements on existing knowledge. Id. § 103; Graham, 383 U.S. at 6; 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850). 
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the information necessary to make and use the invention.39 In 
contrast, inventors can often profit from their work while keeping the 
invention confidential and relying on trade secret protection,40 rather 
than making the invention public. 41 For example, if an inventor 
develops a more efficient process for manufacturing an item, the 
inventor may be able to keep the process secret and profit by 
undercutting the price of competitors who must use the less efficient, 
publicly available process to manufacture the item.42 
Public commercialization can irrevocably surrender a trade 
secret.43 Even such paradigmatic trade secrets as the recipe for Coke 
or Kentucky Fried Chicken are subject to discovery by reverse 
engineering.44 Without the protection of patent law, competitors who 
learn the secret by proper means45 can make use of it without having 
spent the time and money to develop it. In economic terms, this gives 
the competitor an advantage over the innovator in pricing because the 
competitor does not need to recover research and development costS.46 
39. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make and use the same .... "). 
40. As long as the requirements for trade secrecy (valuable confidential information as 
to which reasonable steps are taken to maintain its confidentiality) are met, a trade secret may 
be maintained-in theory, indefinitely, but a public disclosure of the trade secret would destroy 
it. Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 1(4), 2 (amended 1985). 
41. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
42. Jefferson is frequently cited for his observation that "[h]e who receives an idea from 
me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, 
receives light without darkening me." Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former US President, to 
Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) (available at http://hdl.loc.govlloc.mss/mtj.mtjbib020976).''This 
observation was clearly a lapse of economic judgment for the sake of rhetoric. The basis of trade 
secret law is that there is economic value in keeping competitors in the dark." Max Stul 
Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 
229, 236 n.20 (1999). 
43. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. (amended 1985). As Thomas Jefferson observed: 
If nature has made anyone thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive 
property, it is ... an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he 
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of 
everyone [sic] .... 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former U.S. President, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) 
(available at http://hdl.loc.govlloc.mss/mtj.mtjbib020976). 
44. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. Of course, a competitor who reverse engineered the 
formula would still face the task of convincing consumers that it had successfully done so. As of 
the date of publication of this Article, the recipes for Coke and Kentucky Fried Chicken remain 
protected trade secrets. 
45. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act prohibits acquisition by improper means. 
Misappropriation may be enjoined or give rise to damages. Id. §§ 2(a), 3(a). Misappropriation is 
defined as "acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know 
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means." Id. § 1(2)(i). 
46. Id. § 3 cmt. 
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The prospect of a competitor using the same innovation at a lower cost 
reduces the incentive to innovate.47 
A patent gives its owner the right to prevent competitors from 
making, using, selling, or importing the patented invention for a 
period starting on the date the USPTO issues the patent,48 and ending 
twenty years after the date the owner files the patent application.49 
An infringer of these rights is liable for damages that are to be no less 
than a reasonable royalty.50 Courts may also enjoin infringements51 
and may award attorney fees in certain cases.52 Thus, by providing 
the right to exclude competitors from the use of the innovation for a 
limited term, the patent statute may be viewed as an incentive for 
innovators to share their ideas.53 
It is important to recognize that "[t]he patent laws attempt to 
reconcile this Nation's deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with the 
need to encourage progress,"54 and that Congress designed the patent 
statute to encourage some, but not all, innovation. Congress designed 
certain sections of the statute to ensure that what an applicant seeks 
to patent is, in fact, innovative and "worth the embarrassment" of 
granting a patent.55 Under 35 U.S.C. § 111, patent applications must 
be submitted in writing, and under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the application 
must be detailed enough to demonstrate that the applicant has 
possession of enough data to describe the invention and how to make 
47. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974). 
48. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(I) (2006). 
49. Id. § 154(a)(2). Some patent terms are subject to adjustment In certain 
circumstances related to delays in processing by the Patent Office. Id. § 154(b). 
50. Id. § 284. 
51. Id. § 283. In eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the Court held 
that even in patent cases, a court must apply the traditional equitable four-factor test in deciding 
whether it is appropriate to issue an injunction. Id. at 391. 
52. 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
53. Some inventions lend themselves to commercialization without surrendering trade 
secrecy. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 477-78. For example, a machine that makes it cheaper to produce 
an end product may be kept as a trade secret while the inventor profits by sale of the end 
product. Most states recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as beyond the 
protection of trade secret law. See, e.g., id. at 476. Thus, products that reveal the secret are 
difficult to commercialize while maintaining trade secrecy, and, for this reason, works of 
authorship are often difficult to commercialize while maintaining trade secrecy. Computer 
software, however, is a large commercially valuable class of works of authorship that may be 
commercialized publicly, protected by copyright and maintained as a trade secret by releasing 
executable code only, or by marketing services performed using the software rather than the 
software itself. "Cloud computing" utilizes this business model. 
54. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see 
also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966). 
55. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Former US President, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 
1813) (available at http://hdl.loc.govnoc.mssimtj.mtjbib020976); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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and use it.56 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the application must demonstrate 
novelty, while 35 U.S.C. § 103 requires non-obviousness. 57 These 
requirements are technology neutral; they apply to any claimed 
invention and are not intended to preclude patentability of specific 
types of inventions.58 In addition to the statute's generally applicable 
novelty, non-obviousness, and enablement requirements, Congress 
specifically restricted patentability to four categories of statutory 
subject matter, and excluded certain types of inventions from 
patentability. 59 The technology-specific statutory exclusions shed 
little light on the dividing line between patentable subject matter and 
unpatentable discoveries.60 These exclusions share no common 
theoretical basis-they are simply examples of case-by-case lobbying 
power. 
B. Evolution of the Statute 
The current patent statute sets several hurdles for 
patentability.61 The Federal Circuit views § 101 as a gatekeeper,62 
restricting the grant of patents to just four-and only 
four63-categories of invention: processes, machines, manufactures, 
and compositions of matter.64 
The "statutory subject matter" language of the current statute 
is virtually unchanged from that of the first patent statute, enacted in 
1790.65 The first patent statute provided for patenting of "any useful 
art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement 
56. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 111-112. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. § 101. 
59. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 111. 
60. 13 U.S.C. § 151; Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 
284 (amending 35 U.S. C.). Although theoretically patentable, medical procedures are, in effect, 
not worth patenting as Congress has denied remedies for infringement of such patents. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 287(c)(1). 
61. As discussed in Part LA, supra, an invention must be useful, novel, and nonobvious 
in order to be patentable, and the applicant for a patent must supply a written description of the 
invention sufficient to teach others how to make and use it. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112. 
62. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding § 101 to be a 
threshold issue that must be addressed before other questions of patentability); In re Bergy, 596 
F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("The first door which must be opened on the difficult path to 
patentability is § 101."). 
63. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 486 (1974) ("No patent is available 
for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express 
categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101."). 
64. 35 U.S.C. § 10l. 
65. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
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therein not before known or used,"66 if a majority of a board composed 
of the Secretary of State (then Thomas Jefferson), the Secretary of 
War (then Henry Knox), and the Attorney General (then Edmund 
Randolph) considered "the invention or discovery sufficiently useful 
and important."67 
The second patent statute, enacted in 1793,68 explicitly added 
the term "composition of matter" to the list of statutory subject 
matter.69 The 1793 definition of "statutory subject matter" remained 
unchanged until 1952,70 when Congress amended what would later 
become § 101 by replacing the word "art" with "process," and providing 
a definition of the term "process" in § 100(b).71 The Supreme Court 
66. Id. 
67. Section 1 of the statute provided: 
That upon the petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General of the United States, 
setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have invented or discovered any useful art, 
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before 
known or used ... it shall and may be lawful to and for the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two of them, if 
they shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to cause 
letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States, to bear test[s] by the 
President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said 
petition, and describing the said invention or discovery, clearly, truly and fully, and 
thereupon granting to such petitioner ... for any term not exceeding fourteen years, 
the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using and vending to 
others to be used, the said invention or discovery .... 
Id. at 109-10. 
68. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 318-19 (repealed 1836). "This bill was 
probably one written by Thomas Jefferson himself .... " P.J. Federico, The Patent Act of 1793, 
18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 77, 77 (SPECIAL ISSUE), (1936). The Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 U.S. 1 (1966) characterizes Jefferson as the "moving spirit" of the patent statute and the 
author of the 1793 Act. Id. at 7. 
69. The 1793 statute provided: 
That when any person ... being a citizen ... of the United States, shall allege that he 
... [has] invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter, not known or used before the application, and shall present a 
petition to the Secretary of State, ... it shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary 
of State, to cause letters patent to be made out .... 
Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-20 (repealed 1836). 
70. Congress amended the patent statute in 1836, but the amendment did not affect the 
definition of statutory subject matter. Patent Act of 1836 § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. The 
1836 amendments were largely directed to eliminating abuses under the 1793 system, which 
allowed patents to be issued "without any examination into the merit or novelty of the invention" 
thereby producing a large number of patents that were "worthless and void, as conflicting with, 
and infringing upon one another, or upon public rights not subject to patent privileges; arising 
either from a want of due attention to the specifications of claim, or from the ignorance of the 
patentees of the state of the arts" and "a great number of lawsuits ... onerous to the courts, 
ruinous to the parties, and injurious to society .... " S. REP. 24-239, at 3-4 (1839). The 1836 
statute established a Patent Office within the Department of State to review applications to 
determine patentability prior to issue. Patent Act of 1836 § 6. 
71. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
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has made clear that neither change was substantive.72 In the most 
recent overhaul of the patent statute, Congress left the definition of 
"statutory subject" matter unchanged. 73 Thus, the current statutory 
language differs from the original language in only two respects: the 
addition of the category "composition of matter" in 1793 and the 
change from "art" to "process" in 1952, both of which courts have held 
to be non-substantive.74 
C. Evolution of Supreme Court Interpretation of "Statutory Subject 
Matter" 
While the Congressional definition of "statutory subject 
matter" has remained fundamentally constant since the founding of 
the Republic, and the Supreme Court has "more than once cautioned 
that courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and 
conditions which the legislature has not expressed,"75 the Court has 
nevertheless imposed a series of exceptions amounting to judicial 
redefinitions of statutory subject matter.76 The Court's current 
72. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) ("[A] process has historically enjoyed 
patent protection because it was considered a form of 'art' as that term was used in the 1793 
Act."). 
73. America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Congo § 14 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C.). The 
Act explicitly excluded tax strategy inventions from eligibility by amending the rules for 
evaluating prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, and it established a process for reviewing 
patentability of business methods, but it did not change the fundamental definition of statutory 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. 
74. While the 1790 statute did not explicitly include "compositions of matter," this 
category was, under English precedent, considered within the term "manufacture." In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk, J., concurring). Processes, though not mentioned in the 
1793 statute, were considered patentable subject matter. In Corning V. Bu.rden, 56 U.S. 252 
(1854), the Court held that "[a] process, eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in our act 
of Congress. It is included under the general term 'useful art.''' Id. at 267. In Cochrane V. Deener, 
94 U.S. 780 (1877), the Court held: 
That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of the 
instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed .... A process is a mode of treatment of 
certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed 
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If 
new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a piece of machinery. In the language of 
the patent law, it is an art. 
Id. at 787-88. In Tilghman V. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881), the Court held, ''That a patent can be 
granted for a process, there can be no doubt. The patent law is not confined to new machines and 
new compositions of matter, but extends to any new and useful art or manufacture. A 
manufacturing process is clearly an art .... " Id. at 723. Finally, in Diamond V. Diehr, the 1952 
statutory change from "art" to "process" was held to si.mply moderni.ze the eighteenth-century 
term "art" which, in contemporary terminology, would have included processes. 450 U.S. at 175. 
"Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent protection for a 'process' did not change with the 
addition of that term to § 101." Id. at 184. 
75. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (citations omitted). 
76. Alternative justifications have been offered, treating inventions falling within the 
exceptions as either "not inventive" or as obvious, on the theory that laws of nature are in the 
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definition excludes laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas. 77 Tracing the path to that definition should prove informative. 
1. Scientific Principles 
The Court's exploration of the meaning of "statutory subject 
matter" began with a series of decisions in the 1850s in which the 
Court attempted to draw a distinction between understanding a 
scientific principle and finding a use for the principle. 78 The Court 
concluded that "[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; 
an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can 
claim in either of them an exclusive right [sic],,79 and that "[i]t is for 
the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of 
producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and 
not for the result or effect itself."80 
The Court's application of the distinction between 
understanding a scientific principle and finding a use for the principle 
is illustrated in O'Reilly v. Morse,81 the 1854 case determining the 
patentability of Samuel Morse's invention of the telegraph. Morse had 
claimed his invention in several ways: (1) as "a process of using 
electromagnetism to produce distinguishable signs for telegraphy";82 
(2) as a "system of signs, consisting of dots and spaces, and of dots, 
spaces, and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters, words, or sentences, 
substantially as herein set forth and illustrated, for telegraphic 
purposes";83 and (3) as "the use of the motive power of the electro or 
galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, 
for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters at any 
distances .... "84 The Court found the first two formulations of the 
invention patentable and the third unpatentable, distinguishing 
between patentable specific uses of electromagnetism and 
unpatentable claims to the use of magnetism as a motive power, 
public domain, presumably meaning that they were constructively known, although only recently 
discovered. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Sarnoff, supra note 19. 
Neither can be supported by a testable rationale, see infra note 320, and in any event, whatever 
the terminology used, the Court is still rewriting the statute. 
77. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
78. In 1853, as now, the patent statute required that the invention for which a patent 
was sought must be "useful." See supra note 65. 
79. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). 
80. Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1854). 
8l. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854). 
82. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972) (citing Morse, 56 U.S. at 111). 
83. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 983 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84. Morse, 56 U.S. at 62. 
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without specifying how the concept was used. 85 The Court rejected the 
third formulation86 because it attempted to claim something that 
Morse had not invented and could not describe.87 
The Morse case would yield the same result today, but a court 
would likely decide the issue under 35 U.S.C. § 112, which requires 
that an applicant for a patent provide a written description 
sufficiently instructing others how to make and use the claimed 
invention,88 rather than under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The language in the 
Court's opinion that Morse "indeed had not invented"89 could be 
stretched to mean that Morse's discovery was not an invention, but 
the context better supports a reading that Morse's claim covered 
things that Morse had not yet invented.90 
In 1874, the Court declared that "an idea of itself is not 
patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically 
useful is.''91 The idea in question was the creation of a small hole in a 
rubber eraser meant to allow the eraser to fit on the end of a penci1.92 
The Court observed that "the idea of this patentee was a good one, but 
85. Id. at 112-13. 
86. The third formulation was Claim 8 of the Morse application. Id. at 113. Patent 
applicants are allowed to present multiple claims to the same invention for reasons that should 
be clear from the Court's decision: although each relates to the same invention, the scope that is 
patentable is unknown until the US Patent and Trademark Office has examined the application 
and the courts have held it valid. See generally id. Therefore, applicants are encouraged to 
present multiple claims: "(a) The specification must conclude with a claim particularly pointing 
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention or 
discovery. (b) More than one claim may be presented provided they differ substantially from each 
other and are not unduly multiplied." 37 C.F.R. § 1. 75 (2012). The Patent Office recommends: 
Many of the difficulties encountered in the prosecution of patent applications after 
final rejection may be alleviated if each applicant includes, at the time of filing or no 
later than the first reply, claims varying from the broadest to which he or she believes 
he or she is entitled to the most detailed that he or she is willing to accept. 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01(m) (8th 
ed. rev. 8, 2010). 
87. "In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not 
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when he obtained his 
patent. The Court is of opinion that the claim is too broad, and not warranted by law." Morse, 56 
U.S. at 113. 
88. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) ("The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make and use the same .... "). 
89. Morse, 56 U.S. at 113 ("In fine he claims ... [a] process which he has not described 
and indeed had not invented."). 
90. In fact, the Court also observed, "For aught that we now know some future inventor, 
in the onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by 
means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the process or combination 
set forth in the plaintiff's specification." Morse, 56 U.S. at 113. 
91. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874). 
92. Id. 
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his device to give it effect, though useful, was not new," and was 
therefore not patentable.93 As the Court construed the claims, all that 
the inventor had done was to recognize, as others had before, that, "if 
a solid substance was inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber 
smaller than itself, the rubber would cling to it."94 
The Court noted that this observation of a natural 
characteristic of rubber "adds nothing ... patentable."95 In the 
Court's view, "the small opening in the piece of rubber not limited in 
form or shape, was not patentable, neither was the elasticity of the 
rubber [sic]."96 The Court refused to allow a patent for what it viewed 
as "the idea that if a pencil is inserted into a cavity in a piece of rubber 
smaller than itself the rubber will attach itself to the pencil, and when 
so attached become convenient for use as an eraser .... "97 
Under this view of the claim, the Court would reach the same 
result today under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (or § 103).98 Accepting the view 
that it was already known that inserting something into a hole in a 
piece of rubber is a convenient way to provide an eraser, it is hard to 
see the non-obviousness of doing so using a pencil as the "something." 
In Tilghman u. Proctor,99 the Court looked to English precedent 
to conclude that there was a "true distinction between a mere 
principle ... and a process by which a principle is applied to effect a 
useful result."lOO The Court noted: 
That a hot-blast is better than a cold·blast for smelting iron in a furnace was the 
principle or scientific fact discovered by Neilson; and yet, being nothing but a principle, 
he could not have a patent for that. But having invented and practically exemplified a 
process for utilizing this principle, namely, that of heating the blast, in a receptacle, 
between the blowing apparatus and the furnace, he was entitled to a patent for that 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. 35 U.S.C. § 102 precludes patentability for things that are not new. § 102 (2006). 
Arguably, while the eraser and its properties were known, as were pencils and erasers, the 
combination would be viewed as a new combination, but even under this view, § 103 would likely 
bar patentability today. That section provides: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of [35 U.S.C.], if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
Id. § 103. Section 103 was not added to the statute until 1952. Id. (originally enacted as Patent 
Act of 1952, July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792, 792). However, by 1874 the principle that 
would be codified in § 103 had been recognized by the Supreme Court. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 
52 U.S. 248, 257 (1851). 
99. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881). 
100. Id. at 724. 
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process. . .. Another person might invent a better apparatus for applying the 
process ... .101 
17 
Showing that even the highest court in the land has no 
particular insight into the future, the Court opined, 
It seems to us that this clear and exact summary of the law affords the key to almost 
every case that can arise. . .. Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be 
produced in any art by the use of certain means is entitled to a patent for it, provided he 
specifies the means. . .. [I]t is enough, in the patent, to point out the process to be 
performed, without giving supererogatory directions as to the apparatus or method to be 
employed. If the mode of applying the process is not obvious, then a description of a 
particular mode by which it may be applied is sufficient. . .. Perhaps the process is 
susceptible of being applied in many modes and by the use of many forms of apparatus. 
The inventor is not bound to describe them all.... But he must describe some 
particular mode, or some apparatus, by which the process can be applied .... 102 
A modern court thus could resolve the case comfortably under 
35 U.S.C. § 112; having shown one way to carry out a process 
embodying a chemical principle, the Court held that the inventor was 
entitled to a patent covering the process, regardless of the 
mechanisms that might be used to carry out the process.103 
In 1891, the Court continued the effort to define patentable 
subject matter, this time by defining the concept of "invention." 104 The 
Court concluded, "[t]he truth is the word ["invention"] cannot be 
defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid m 
determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the 
inventive faculty or not."105 
101. Id. at 724-25. 
102. Id. at 728-29. 
103. Id. at 709-10. 
104. Interestingly, the term "invention" has never been defined in a US patent statute. 
The current statute includes "invention" in the list of definitions, but the definition is "invention 
or discovery." 35 U.S.C. § 100(a) (2006). 
105. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891). The Court went on to note: 
What shall be construed as invention within the meaning of the patent laws has been 
made the subject of a great amount of discussion . . . . By some, "invention" is 
described as the contriving or constructing of that which had not before existed; and 
by another, giving a construction to the patent law, as "the finding out, contriving, 
devising or creating something new and useful, which did not exist before, by an 
operation of the intellect." To say that the act of invention is the production of 
something new and useful does not solve the difficulty of giving an accurate definition, 
since the question of what is new, as distinguished from that which is a colorable 
variation of what is old, is usually the very question in issue. To say that it involves 
an operation of the intellect, is a product of intuition, or of something akin to genius, 
as distinguished from mere mechanical skill, draws one somewhat nearer to an 
appreciation of the true distinction, but it does not adequately express the idea. The 
truth is, the word cannot be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in 
determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the inventive faculty 
or not. In a given case we may be able to say that there is present invention of a very 
high order. In another we can see that there is lacking that impalpable something 
which distinguishes invention from simple mechanical skill. Courts, adopting fixed 
principles as a guide, have by a process of exclusion determined that certain 
variations in old devices do or do not involve invention; but whether the variation 
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In 1933, the Court tangentially addressed patentable subject 
matter in a case involving ownership of an invention developed by a 
government employee outside the scope of his employment. 106 The 
Court rejected a theory that would imply an assignment from 
employees to employers, in part because of the difficulty of identifying 
the point at which invention took place. 107 The Court observed, "the 
act of invention ... consists neither in finding out the laws of nature, 
nor in fruitful research as to the operation of natural laws, but in 
discovering how those laws may be utilized or applied for some 
beneficial purpose, by a process, a device or a machine."lo8 
In 1939, the Court, in dictum, made a subtle change m 
language, which in retrospect marked a significant change m 
philosophy. In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of 
America,109 the parties asked the Court to construe a claim for a radio 
antenna produced according to a previously known formula for 
calculating optimum configuration. llo The Court held that the 
accused device did not infringe the claimed invention. III In construing 
the claim, the trial court viewed the invention as the relationship of 
components determined by a formula that was disclosed in the 
specifications. 1l2 A third party had developed the formula, which had 
been published in a scientific journal years earlier.l13 Nevertheless, 
the Court assumed that the patent claim covered an invention and 
relied upon in a particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical skill is a 
question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition. 
[d. at 426-27. 
106. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 182 (1933). 
107. [d. at 187-88. 
108. [d. at 188 ("The reluctance of courts to imply or infer an agreement by the employee 
to assign his patent is due to a recognition of the peculiar nature of the act of invention, which 
consists neither in finding out the laws of nature, nor in fruitful research as to the operation of 
natural laws, but in discovering how those laws may be utilized or applied for some beneficial 
purpose, by a process, a device, or a machine. It is the result of an inventive act, the birth of an 
idea and its reduction to practice; the product of original thought; a concept demonstrated to be 
true by practical application or embodiment in tangible form."). 
109. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939). 
110. [d. at 98-99. 
111. [d. at 102. 
112. [d. at 92. 
113. [d. at 93-94 ("Carter did not invent the formula. It had been developed by Abraham 
and published in a scientific journal thirty years before .... Abraham's formula expressed the 
scientific truth that when radio activity is projected from a charged wire of finite length, i.e., one 
having standing waves, and having a length of a multiple of half wave lengths, the angle 
between the direction of the principal radio activity and the wire is dependent on wave length 
and wire length, which is a multiple of half wave lengths .... It is plain, therefore, that the 
Carter invention, if it was invention, consisted in taking the angle of the Abraham formula as the 
angle between each wire of the V antenna and its bisector." (emphasis added)). 
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was valid,114 and stated in dictum115 that "[w]hile a scientific truth, or 
the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable, a novel and 
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth 
may be."116 
While irrelevant to the resolution of the case before the Court, 
and supported by no citation of authority, this language marked a 
shift from earlier statutory-subject-matter cases. Tilghman required 
only that an applicant provide one practical process for using a 
scientific principle, whereas the dictum in Mackay laid the foundation 
for the Court's first general exclusion from patentable statutory 
subject matter: scientific principles.1l7 
2. Laws of Nature 
The second exception to patentable statutory subject matter, 
laws of nature, emerged from the 1948 case of Funk Bros. Seed Co. u. 
Kalo Inoculant.1 18 The technology at issue involved the application of 
root nodule bacteria to certain field crops to increase yield.1l9 Prior to 
the "invention," farmers used several different types of bacterial 
inoculants depending on the type of crop. 120 Inoculant manufacturers 
believed farmers needed to apply each inoculant independently 
because of mutual inhibition.121 The "invention" claimed a 
combination of several inoculants, which the applicant had found 
could efficiently coexist. 122 In holding the invention unpatentable, the 
Court announced another exception to the statutory language in 
35 U.S.C. § 101, choosing expansive language when (as a dissenting 
opinion points out) a much narrower ground of decision was 
available.123 The majority held that the combination of naturally 
occurring inoculants was a product of nature, even though the Court 
cited no evidence that the combination naturally occurred together, 
114. Id. at 94 ('We assume, without deciding the point, that this advance was invention 
even though it was achieved by the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar type 
of antenna."). 
115. The issue would arise if the accused device had been covered by the claim and if the 
applicant had invented the formula rather than adapted a previously published formula. In that 
case, there would be infringement unless the claim were invalid, and patentability could not be 
defeated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, so it would be necessary to reach the 35 U.S.C. § 101 issue. 
116. Mackay, 306 U.S. at 94. 
117. Compare id., with Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1881). 
118. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
119. Id. at 131. 
120. Id. at 129-30. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 130. 
123. Id. at 137 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
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much less in combination in a bag,124 The Court held that "[h]e who 
discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a 
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention 
from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of 
nature to a new and useful end."125 The Court found that the 
"invention" did not constitute an advancement over what already 
existed in nature: 
Each of the species of root nodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same 
group of leguminous plants which it always infected. No species acquires a different 
use. The combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six species 
of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their utility. Each species has the same 
effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their natural way. Their use in 
combination does not improve in any way their natural functioning. They serve the 
ends nature originally provided and act quite independently of any effort of the 
patentee. 126 
The Court drew a distinction between discovering a law of 
nature and applying it: 
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of 
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of 
laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a 
hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law 
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the 
application of the law of nature to a new and useful end.127 
The conclusion that "manifestations of laws of nature" were 
"free to all men" (i.e., not patentable subject matter) established the 
second Supreme Court exception to the statutory language of § 101.128 
Although he concurred in the result, the rationale troubled 
Justice Frankfurter: 
It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms as "the work of nature" and 
the "laws of nature." For these are vague and malleable terms infected with too much 
ambiguity and equivocation. Everything that happens may be deemed "the work of 
nature," and any patentable composite exemplifies in its properties "the laws of 
nature.,,129 
Instead, Justice Frankfurter preferred to decide the case on a 
basis that did not require limiting Congress's statutory language: 
since "the strains that Bond put together in the product which he 
patented can be specified only by the properties of the mixture," the 
application would not satisfy the disclosure requirements (now found 
124. Id. at 130. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 131. 
127. Id. at 130. 
128. The statutory section at issue in Funk Bros. was § 31, comparable to § 101 of the 
statute as revised in 1952. Id. at 132. 
129. Id. at 134-35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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in 35 U.S.C. § 112), and therefore the same decision could be reached 
without creating a new exception to § 101.130 
3. Abstract Ideas 
In 1972, the Court established the "abstract ideas" exception to 
patentable statutory subject matter when it faced a patent application 
that claimed a process for converting numbers from binary-coded 
decimal format to the binary format used by digital computers.131 The 
Court in Gottschalk v. Benson held that a claim to a 
computer-implemented method of converting numbers was not an 
invention under § 101.132 Because the method had "no substantial 
practical application except in connection with a digital computer," it 
was not limited to a specific use and therefore amounted to nothing 
more than an unpatentable mathematical algorithm. 133 The Court 
stated that such a mathematical formula was simply an abstract idea, 
akin to unpatentable phenomena of nature and abstract concepts. 134 
The Court then summarized, "[p]henomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are 
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work."135 Under this theory, the problem with allowing a 
patent on the invention was that it "wholly pre-empts" the use of a 
mathematical formula and therefore was not patentable subject 
matter.136 The Court recognized an alternative ground for reaching 
the same result (without requiring alteration of the statutory 
interpretation), describing the claimed mathematical process as "so 
abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of 
the BCD to pure binary conversion."137 Since Morse precludes a 
130. Id. at 134. The patent claimed "An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a 
plurality of selected mutually non·inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus 
Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fIx nitrogen 
in the leguminous plant for which they are specifIc." U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 (filed Aug. 23, 
1939). 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires an applicant to provide 
a written description of the same, and of the manner and process of making and using 
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use 
the same .... 
§ 112 (2006). 
131. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972). 
132. Id. at 71·72. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 67. 
135. Id. 
136. See id. at 71·72. 
137. Id. at 68. 
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patentee from claiming more than he has actually invented,138 such an 
overly broad claim could be found unpatentable without the need to 
construe § 101.139 
In Dann u. Johnston, the Court had the opportunity to 
invalidate a patent under its newly formulated interpretation of 
35 U.S.C. § 101, but chose instead the less invasive route of finding 
the claim obvious, and therefore unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 
103.140 The invention at issue was claimed as a "machine system for 
automatic record-keeping of bank checks and deposits."141 The system 
allowed bank customers to write category codes on deposit slips and 
checks, which the bank would then encode using magnetic ink when 
the items cleared, allowing the codes to be electronically stored and 
tabulated by data processors so that the bank could provide the 
customer with a summary, subtotaled by category.l42 Following a 
lengthy process within the Patent Office,143 the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals held that the invention was a "record-keeping machine 
system," which was "clearly within the 'technological arts,'" and 
therefore statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.144 The 
Supreme Court invalidated the patent, but avoided the statutory 
subject matter issue by holding the invention obvious under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103.145 
In Parker u. Flook, the Court clarified that a "process is not 
unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature."146 The 
patent at issue included claims to a catalytic conversion process that 
involved the use of a formula, which the Court assumed to be novel 
and useful, to calculate and update "alarm limits."147 Drawing on the 
formulation of Benson, the Court explained that determining whether 
138. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854). 
139. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); In re Dowdall, 315 F.2d 929, 930 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
140. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976) ("Petitioner and respondent, as well as 
various amici, have presented lengthy arguments addressed to the question of the general 
patentability of computer programs .... We find no need to treat that question in this case, 
however, because we conclude that in any event respondent's system is unpatentable on grounds 
of obviousness." (citation omitted». 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 221-22. 
143. The examiner rejected the claims for lack of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102, and as 
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. ld. at 223. Upon appeal, the Patent Office's internal review 
board rejected the claims on a different theory, considering them beyond the field of technology 
and therefore not statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. The Patent Office also 
rejected the claims on grounds of obviousness, rendering the claims unpatentable under 
35 U.S.C. § 103. ld. 
144. Id. at 223-24. 
145. Id. at 225. 
146. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978). 
147. Id. at 586-87. 
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a claim containing a mathematical algorithm is statutory subject 
matter is not simply a matter of whether the claim "wholly pre-empts" 
the mathematical algorithm, but whether "once that algorithm is 
assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a 
whole, contains no patentable invention."148 Noting an "unclear line" 
between an abstract principle and the application of that principle, 149 
the Court concluded that the process was not statutory subject matter 
under § 101 since it was merely a mathematical formula, which was 
"not the kind of 'discover[y], that the statute was enacted to 
protect."150 
Subsequently, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Court explained its 
decision in Flook: the patent application did not "contain any 
disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring 
of the process variables, nor the means of setting off an alarm or 
adjusting an alarm system. All that it provides is a formula for 
computing an updated alarm limit."151 This interpretation suggests 
that the decision in Flook does not implicate statutory subject matter 
at all, but rather is a straightforward application of the 
disclosure/enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.152 
The fate of the biotechnology industry hung in the balance in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, as the application for a patent on the 
invention of a genetically modified bacterium worked its way through 
the courtS. 153 As Chief Justice Burger framed the issue before the 
Supreme Court, "We granted certiorari to determine whether a live, 
human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35 
U.S.C. § 101."154 The fundamental discovery described in the patent 
application was that a bacterium could be genetically modified to give 
it a new property: the ability to digest oil SpillS.155 The application 
148. Id. at 594. 
149. Id. at 589. 
150. Id. at 593; see supra note 9. 
151. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186-87 (1981) (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 586) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
152. The statute's requirements entail: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
153. See Dan L. Burk, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly Prof. of Law, Univ. of Minn., 
Honorable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture: Tailoring Patent Policy to Specific Industries 
(Apr. 10, 2003), in 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 3·4 (2003). 
154. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,305 (1980). 
155. Chakrabarty had inserted plasmids into Pseudomonas bacteria, which gave the 
bacteria a new property, the ability to break down multiple components of crude oil, a property 
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sought to claim the invention in three ways: (1) the method for 
producing the modified bacteria (a process), (2) the modified bacteria 
mixed with a carrier that would float on water (a composition of 
matter), and (3) the bacteria themselves. 156 The patent examiner 
granted the first two categories of claims, but rejected claims to the 
bacteria themselves because they were "products of nature," and living 
things were unpatentable per se.l57 
The Patent Office's internal review board overruled the 
examiner's "product of nature" rejection, concluding that genetically 
modified bacteria did not occur naturally; it affirmed the rejection per 
the "living things" rationale.l58 The appellate court reversed, holding 
the claims to the organism to be patentable.l59 In 1980, the Supreme 
Court viewed the issue as "a narrow one of statutory interpretation 
requiring us to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101," and began the analysis by 
repeating its caution from Dubilier, that courts "should not read into 
the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has 
not expressed."160 The Court reviewed the legislative history of the 
1952 Patent Act,161 and concluded that "[i]n choosing such expansive 
terms as 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,' modified by the 
comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent 
laws would be given wide scope."162 Thus, the Court held that the 
bacterium, although living, was patentable subject matter.l63 
Having disposed of the case before it, the Court then went on to 
consolidate the current judicial interpretation of the limits on 
statutory subject matter: 
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every discovery. The 
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable. 
Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not 
"which is possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria" and ''believed to have significant value 
for the treatment of oil spills." See id. 
156. Id. at 305-06. 
157. Id. at 306. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. The route to the Court was convoluted, involving two petitions for certiorari and 
a remand for reconsideration. Id. at 306-07. 
160. Id. at 307-08 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 
(1933». 
161. Id. at 308-09. The Committee Report accompanying the 1952 Act included a 
statement that "a person may have 'invented' a machine or a manufacture, which may include 
anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 
101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled." S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. 
NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). The Court interpreted the language as "inform[ing] us that Congress 
intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.'" 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979; H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923). 
162. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. 
163. Id. at 310. 
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patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that 
E=mc2, nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are 
"manifestations of ... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.,,164 
25 
The Court thus created three broad exceptions to the statutory 
language, while concluding that Congress intended to give patents a 
wide scope and reminding the lower courts that "our obligation is to 
take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the 
legislative history and statutory purpose."165 
4. Patentable Subject Matter Mter Chakrabarty 
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court reiterated that "laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" were not patentable. 166 
Furthermore, "while a claim drawn to a fundamental principle is 
unpatentable, 'an application of a law of nature or mathematical 
formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of 
patent protection."'167 The Court then affirmed the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals' decision, which had overruled the Patent Office's 
Benson-based rejection. 16S The applicant had claimed an improvement 
in making molded rubber products, which involved monitoring the 
temperature inside the mold and using a well-known equation to 
calculate the required cure time based on the measured 
temperature. 169 
164. Id. at 309 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948» (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); 
O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112·121 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853). 
165. Id. at 313, 315. 
166. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
167. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187-88). 
168. Id. at 180-81. 
169. [d. at 187. The first claim provided: 
A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds with 
the aid of a digital computer, comprising: providing said computer with a data base for 
said press including at least, natural logarithm conversion data (In), the activation 
energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being molded, and a 
constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press, 
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press for 
monitoring the elapsed time of said closure, constantly determining the temperature 
(Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during 
molding, constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z), repetitively 
calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius 
equation for reaction time during the cure, which is In v = CZ + x where v is the total 
required cure time, repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals 
during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with 
the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and opening the press automatically 
when a said comparison indicates equivalence. 
[d. at 179 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The Patent Office rejected the claim as not falling within 
statutorily acceptable subject matter.170 The Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals reversed, holding that a claim is not nonstatutory per 
se simply because a computer is involved. l7l While reiterating that an 
algorithm or mathematical formula is like a law of nature, which 
cannot be the subject of a patent, the Supreme Court held that the 
claim was not an attempt to patent a mathematical formula but 
rather "a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly 
employs a well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to 
pre-empt the use of that equation."l72 The Court traced the 
development of its rule for determining whether a process was 
statutory subject matter, noting that in Benson the Court "repeated 
the ... definition recited in Cochrane v. Deener, adding: 
'Transformation and reduction of an article "to a different state or 
thing" is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not 
include particular machines."'173 
The Court declined an opportunity to clarify application of the 
"natural phenomenon" exception in Laboratory Corp. of America u. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.174 The patent at issue claimed a process 
for diagnosing vitamin deficiency by correlating the level of a 
compound in blood with the deficiency.175 The district court upheld a 
jury verdict that the patent was valid and infringed, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether the claim was invalid as an attempt to "claim a 
monopoly over a basic scientific relationship."176 The Court, however, 
170. Id. at 179. 
171. Id. at 181. 
172. Id. at 187. The Court stated: 
We have before us today only the question of whether respondents' claims fall within 
the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter. We view respondents' 
claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an 
attempt to patent a mathematical formula. . . . [Wlhen a claim containing a 
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process 
which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws 
were designed to protect (e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state 
or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101. Because we do not view 
respondents' claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be 
drawn to an industrial process for the molding of rubber products, we affirm .... 
Id. at 191-93. 
173. Id. at 184. 
174. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. (Labcorp), 548 U.S. 124, 
125-26 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
175. Id. at 129. The patent claimed "A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or 
folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps of: assaying a body fluid for an elevated 
level of total homocysteine; and correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body 
fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
176. Id. at 132. 
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dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, with three justices 
dissenting. 177 
In 2010, the Court presented a clear summary of its 
then-current interpretation of the language of § 101 in Bilski v. 
Kappos.l78 The patent application at issue claimed a 
computer-implemented system that employed a mathematical formula 
for hedging risk. 179 The Patent Office and lower courts all held the 
claims were not valid statutory subject matter .180 In affirming, the 
Court summarized: 
Section 101 specifies four independent categories of inventions or discoveries that are 
patent eligible .... "Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given 
wide scope .... " The Court's precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101's 
broad principles: "laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas." While not 
required by the statutory text, these exceptions are consistent with the notion that a 
patentable process must be "new and useful." And in any case, the exceptions have 
defined the statute's reach as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.181 
The Court. took the opportunity to remind the Federal Circuit 
that it had provided no bright-line test for patentability: 
The machine-or-transformation test182 is not the sole test for patent eligibility under 
§ 101. The Court's precedents establish that although that test may be a useful and 
important clue or investigative tool, it is not the sole test for deciding whether an 
invention is a patent-eligible "process" under § 101. In holding to the contrary, the 
Federal Circuit violated two principles of statutory interpretation: Courts "should not 
read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not 
expressed," and "[u]nless otherwise defined, 'words will be interpreted as taking their 
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."'183 
Finally, in March, 2012, the Court answered the question it 
had thought premature in 2010. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc_,184 although noting that "too broad an 
interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent 
law" because "all inventions at some level embody ___ laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,"185 a unanimous Court 
reiterated the exclusions from statutory subject matter, stating that 
"'laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas' are not 
177. Id. at 125. 
178. See 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010). 
179. Id. at 3220. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 3221 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303, 308, 309 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted». 
182. This is the test the Federal Circuit had applied, id., relying on language in Diamond 
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981). 
183. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221 (citation omitted) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183). 
184. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
185. Id. at 1293. 
28 VANDERBILTJ. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 15:1:1 
patentable."186 In Mayo, the inventor had discovered the precise 
correlation between the level of a drug metabolite in a patient's blood 
and the efficacy of the dose of the drug the patient was taking. 187 A 
representative claim to the method of optimizing the drug dosage 
required administering the drug, measuring the level of the 
metabolite in the patient, and decreasing or increasing the dosage 
depending on whether the metabolite level was above or below a 
specified trigger level.188 
Echoing the concerns over monopolization of a law of nature 
voiced in dissent in Labcorp, Justice Breyer, now writing for a 
unanimous court, held that the claim amounted to no more than 
informing a "relevant audience about certain laws of nature" followed 
by "conventional activity" and was unpatentable.189 
Summarizing the Court's holdings, "laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable subject matter.190 
"A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; ... these cannot 
be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive 
right."191 These categories are unpatentable because they are "part of 
the storehouse of knowledge ... free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none."192 The Court's explanations of this conclusion 
reduce to this simple tautology: laws of nature are not patentable 
because no one may possess the exclusive right to them that would be 
granted by a patent. 193 
D. Federal Circuit Applications-A Struggle to Keep Up 
The history of the development of the judicial exceptions to the 
language of § 101 would not be complete without a brief review of the 
efforts of the Federal Circuit and its predecessors to implement the 
rules announced by the Supreme Court.194 
186. Id. at 1290 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981». 
187. Id. at 1294-95. 
188. Id. at 1295. 
189. Id. at 1298. 
190. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
191. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). 
192. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
193. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Flook, 437 U.S. at 589; Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; Funk 
Bros., 333 U.S. at 130; Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175. 
194. Since October 1, 1982, all appeals of patentability decisions have gone to the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006). The Federal Circuit is therefore the 
principal interpreter of Supreme Court decisions in the field. Ct. id. The cases appear to evidence 
an attempt by the Federal Circuit to offer simple, bright-line tests for determining patentable 
subject matter, met at every turn by a reminder from the Supreme Court that there are no 
shortcuts, only broad principles. See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 201 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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The Supreme Court itself has conceded that the "line between a 
patentable process and an unpatentable principle is not always 
clear."195 In an effort to apply the general rules announced by the 
Court to specific cases and to provide some degree of guidance and 
predictability, the lower courts have announced, and then abandoned, 
a series of shortcut tests for dividing unpatentable subject matter from 
patentable subject matter.196 
As the appeals courts attempt to understand the Court's 
guidance, a sense of frustration over the seeming impossibility of 
implementing such guidance in practice surfaces, 197 raising the 
question of whether a standard which the courts can neither 
understand nor implement can be good law. 
In a concurring opinion in Arrhythmia Research Technology, 
Inc. u. Corazonix Corp., Judge Rader agreed with the majority's 
determination of patentability, but stated, "Rather than perpetuate a 
non-statutory standard, I would find that the subject matter of the 
'459 patent satisfies the statutory standards of the Patent ACt."198 In 
In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit observed: 
The Supreme Court has not been clear ... as to whether such subject matter is excluded 
from the scope of § 101 because it represents laws of nature, natural phenomena, or 
abstract ideas. The Supreme Court also has not been clear as to exactly what kind of 
mathematical subject matter may not be patented. The Supreme Court has used, 
among others, the terms "mathematical algorithm," "mathematical formula," and 
"mathematical equation" to describe types of mathematical subject matter not entitled 
to patent protection standing alone. The Supreme Court has not set forth, however, any 
consistent or clear explanation of what it intended by such terms or how these terms are 
related, if at all.199 
195. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589. See also Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Labcorp: 
I concede that the category of non patentable "(p)henomena of nature," like the 
categories of "mental processes" and "abstract intellectual concepts," is not easy to 
define. After all, many a patentable invention rests upon its inventor's knowledge of 
natural phenomena; many "process" patents seek to make abstract intellectual 
concepts workably concrete; and all conscious human action involves a mental process. 
548 U.S. 124, 134 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
196. E.g., Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (Rader, J., concurring) (''In the wake of Benson, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
struggled to implement the algorithm rule. Much of the difficulty sprang from the obscurity of 
the terms invoked to preclude patentability-terms like 'law of nature,' 'natural phenomena,' 
'formulae,' or 'algorithm.'" (footnote omitted) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 65». 
197. Commentators have also misapprehended the Court's commands. Perhaps overly 
optimistically, A. Samuel Oddi concluded in 2006 that "[w)hat has become apparent is that § 101 
patentable subject matter, after Chakrabarty, Diehr, and State Street, is no longer a significant 
impediment to patentability." A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory 
Subject Matter, 46 IDEA 491,557 (2006). 
198. 958 F.2d at 1061 (Rader, J., concurring). 
199. 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The Federal Circuit is 
not alone in its confusion as to how to apply the Supreme Court tests. While concurring in the 
result in Bilski, Justice Stevens observed that the majority had failed to explain how it reached 
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The Federal Circuit's confusion is understandable. As will be 
seen, later efforts by the Supreme Court to clarify the scope of the 
exclusions were not completely successful. 
1. The "Mental Steps" and "Function of a Machine" Exceptions 
The dissent in Diehr summarized several early attempts by the 
appellate courts to formulate a coherent jurisprudence consistent with 
the Supreme Court's theory of exceptions to the statutory language 
first articulated in Corning u. Burden: "[It] is well settled that a man 
cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, 
but only for the machine which produces it."200 The Court 
subsequently reaffirmed the doctrine on several occasions."201 
However, when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals abandoned 
the function-of-a-machine exception in In re Tarczy-Hornoch,202 it 
held that the doctrine was contrary to "the basIc purposes of the 
patent system and productive of a range of undesirable results from 
the harshly inequitable to the silly."203 
Drawing from the Corning language, appellate courts also 
concluded that mental operations were unpatentable per se,204 "based 
upon the familiar principle that a scientific concept or mere idea 
cannot be the subject of a valid patent."205 Courts applied the mental 
steps doctrine inconsistently,206 and in In re Prater, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals abandoned the doctrine, holding that the 
mere fact that a process could be performed mentally did not preclude 
patentability if the process could also be performed without mental 
processes.207 
the conclusion that the claims at issue were abstract ideas. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3235 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
200. Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1854). 
201. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 383 (1909); Busch v. Jones, 184 U.S. 
598, 607 (1902); Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 554·57 (1898); Risdon 
Iron & Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68,78·79,84 (1895). 
202. In re Tarczy·Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 866·67 (C.C.P.A. 1968). 
203. Id. at 867. 
204. In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380-83 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Heritage, 150 
F.2d 554, 556-58 (C.C.P.A. 1945). 
205. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
206. Kevin Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 355 (2007). 
207. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1968), superseded by 415 F.2d 1393 
(C.C.P.A. 1969). The court confirmed the abandonment of the mental steps exception in In re 
Musgrave, when it stated: 
We cannot agree with the board that these claims (all the steps of which can be 
carried out by the disclosed apparatus) are directed to non-statutory processes merely 
because some or all the steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the 
human mind or because it may be necessary for one performing the processes to think. 
431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
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2. The Technological-Arts Requirement 
In In re Musgrave, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
held that a process was statutory subject matter if it was within the 
"technological arts,"208 and in 1970, the court in In re Benson held that 
the presence of a general-purpose computer in a process placed it 
within the technological arts.209 The Supreme Court rejected the 
technological-arts test in Benson.21o Subsequently, the Federal Circuit 
(successor to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) reasoned that 
"[t]he fact that a nonstatutory method is carried out on a programmed 
computer does not make the process claim statutory."211 
3. The Freeman- Walter-Abele Test 
The Freeman- Walter-Abele test, developed in a trio of cases,212 
required a two-step review of claims.213 First, courts were to ascertain 
whether the claim involved a mathematical algorithm.214 If so, the 
courts had to determine whether the algorithm was applied to 
"physical elements or process steps."215 
Applying this test in Abele, the court held that a claim 
involving an algorithm to evaluate data from a CAT scan was 
statutory subject matter because the algorithm influenced 
"production, detection, and display steps as manifestly statutory 
subject matter."21S 
AT&T v. Excel Communications involved a patent issued for an 
addition of a field in a telephone billing record that identified the 
long-distance carriers of the parties on either end of the phone line 
and allowed differential billing by using Boolean logic to determine if 
the carriers were the same.217 The district court held that "the claims 
208. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893. 
209. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
210. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72. 
211. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835,841 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
212. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 905 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767-68 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
213. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245. 
214. Id. 
215. In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905-07. 
216. Id. at 908. 
217. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The first 
claim provided: 
A method for use in a telecommunications system in which interexchange calls 
initiated by each subscriber are automatically routed over the facilities of a particular 
one of a plurality of interexchange carriers associated with that subscriber, said 
method comprising the steps of: generating a message record for an interexchange call 
between an originating subscriber and a terminating subscriber, and including, in 
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implicitly recite a mathematical algorithm, ... and thus fall within 
the judicially created 'mathematical algorithm' exception to statutory 
subject matter."21S In evaluating the application of the 
Freeman- Walter-Abele test to the claims, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that "[w]hatever may be left of the earlier test, if anything, 
this type of physical limitations analysis seems of little value."219 In 
In re Bilski, however, the Federal Circuit again concluded that the 
Freeman- Walter-Abele test was inadequate and "the 
machine-or-transformation test IS the applicable test for 
patent-eligible subject matter ."220 
4. The "Useful, Concrete, and Tangible Result" Test 
In In Re Alappat, the inventor had used an algorithm to 
smooth the appearance of oscilloscope waveforms by varying the 
intensity of displayed pixels as a function of the distance of the pixel 
from the actual waveform.221 The examiner rejected the claims as 
nonstatutory.222 The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the rejection, 
reasoning that, "when the claim is viewed without the steps of this 
mathematical algorithm, no other elements or steps are found."223 
Therefore, the claim did not describe a machine, and it fell within the 
judicially created exception that precluded patenting "mathematical 
algorithms."224 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that, although 
the claim involved a formula, it was directed to a machine. 225 "[T]he 
proper inquiry in dealing with the so called mathematical subject 
matter exception to § 101 alleged herein is to see whether the claimed 
subject matter as a whole is a disembodied mathematical 
concept .... "226 The Federal Circuit held: "That is not the case 
here. . .. This is not a disembodied mathematical concept ... , but 
said message record, a primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indicator having a value 
which is a function of whether or not the interexchange carrier associated with said 
terminating subscriber is a predetermined one of said interexchange carriers. 
Id. at 1354. 
218. Id. at 1355-56. 
219. Id. at 1359. 
220. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff'd, sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 
S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Although the Court affirmed the result, it noted that the 
machine-or-transformation test was but one of several ways of testing patentability and was not 
necessarily a requirement for patentable subject matter. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258. 
221. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
222. Id. at 1531. 
223. Ex parte Alappat, No. 1991-1277,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340, 1346 (B.P.A.I. May 12, 
1992). 
224. Id. at 1344. 
225. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1540-41. 
226. Id. at 1544. 
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rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangible 
result."227 
In State Street Bank & Trust Co. u. Signature Financial Group, 
Inc., the Federal Circuit applied the useful, concrete, and tangible 
result test to an invention for managing a series of financial accounts 
using a series of calculations.228 The court found that: 
[T)he transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine 
through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a 
practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it 
produces "a useful, concrete and tangible result"-a final share price momentarily fixed 
for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory 
authorities and in subsequent trades. 229 
Thus, the invention satisfied the statutory-subject-matter 
requirement.23o Commenting on the decision in a non-binding opinion, 
Justice Breyer, in Labcorp, observed, "[T]he Federal Circuit's decision 
in State Street Bank. .. does say that a process is patentable if it 
produces a 'useful, concrete and tangible result.' But this Court has 
never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the statement 
would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary."231 
Justice Breyer offered the decisions in Morse, Benson, and Flook as 
examples of such instances.232 
5. The Machine-or-Transformation Test 
In In re Ferguson, the Federal Circuit applied the 
machine-or-transformation test to affirm the denial of a patent under 
§ 101.233 The application claimed a method for marketing.234 The 
Patent Office's internal board of appeals rejected the claim as an 
227. Id. 
228. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
229. Id. at 1373. 
230. Id. 
231. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136-37 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
232. Id. 
233. In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
234. The court noted the claim consisted of: 
A method of marketing a product, comprising: developing a shared marketing force, 
said shared marketing force including at least marketing channels, which enable 
marketing a number of related products; using said shared marketing force to market 
a plurality of different products that are made by a plurality of different autonomous 
producing company, so that different autonomous companies, having different 
ownerships, respectively produce said related products; obtaining a share of total 
profits from each of said plurality of different autonomous producing companies in 
return for said using; and obtaining an exclusive right to market each of said plurality 
of products in return for said using. 
Id. at 1361. 
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"abstract idea," and therefore not statutory subject matter.235 The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the board's denial, applying the 
machine-or-transformation test, and concluding Applicant's method 
claims did not meet either prong of the machine-or-transformation 
test. 236 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services 
involved claims similar to those presented in Labcorp, and the Federal 
Circuit again applied its machine-or-transformation test.237 The 
patent claimed methods for calibrating the proper dosage of thiopurine 
drugs by administering a drug, then determining the levels of the 
drug's metabolites in the patient and comparing them to 
pre-determined metabolite levels, "wherein" the measured metabolite 
levels would indicate a need to increase or decrease the level of drug to 
be administered, so as to minimize toxicity and maximize efficacy of 
treatment.238 Mayo contended that the patent claimed natural 
phenomena-the correlations between metabolite levels and efficacy 
and toxicity-and wholly preempted the use of natural phenomena.239 
The district court granted Mayo's motion for summary judgment of 
invalidity under § 101, but the Federal Circuit reversed.240 
The Federal Circuit, believing it was "following the Supreme 
Court," applied the Bilski "definitive test" for determining whether a 
process is patent-eligible under § 101: "A claimed process is surely 
patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different 
state or thing."241 Applying the test, the court concluded that the 
method transformed an article: "[t]he transformation is of the human 
body following administration of a drug and the various chemical and 
235. Id. at 1362. 
236. In reaching its conclusion the court noted: 
Applicants' method claims are not tied to any concrete parts, devices, or combination 
of devices. Nor do Applicants' methods, as claimed, transform any article into a 
different state or thing. . . . [A]s this court stated in Bilski, "[p]urported 
transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal obligations or 
relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test because 
they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not representative of 
physical objects or substances." 
Id. at 1363·64 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008». 
237. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339, 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 
(2010). 
238. Id. at 1339-40. 
239. Id. at 1340-41. 
240. Id. at 1340-41, 1350. 
241. Id. at 1343 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008» (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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physical changes of the drug's metabolites that enable their 
concentrations to be determined."242 
As illustrated above, the Federal Circuit has attempted, with 
limited success and notable frustration, to translate the Supreme 
Court's statements regarding exceptions to the statutory definition of 
subject matter into practice. Its latest attempt in August of 2012 
suggests that there is still an imperfect understanding between the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit. In Ass'n for Molecular 
Pathology v. US Patent & Trademark Office,243 the Federal Circuit 
reconsidered the decision which the Supreme Court had vacated and 
remanded in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics. 244 
While acknowledging the Supreme Court's definition of patentable 
subject matter245 and the rationale behind the definition,246 the 
Federal Circuit reaffirmed the same decision (by the same vote) that 
had been vacated and remanded.247 On the issue of the patentability 
of isolated gene sequences as compositions of matter, the Federal 
Circuit held that the claimed isolated DNA sequence covered 
"compositions of matter, expressly authorized as suitable 
patent-eligible subject matter in § 101."248 Noting that full resolution 
of the issue under the Supreme Court definition also depended on 
whether the appellee claimed "patent-ineligible products of nature," 
the Federal Circuit concluded the appellee did not, holding, "[t]he 
isolated DNA molecules before us are not found in nature."249 The 
242. Id. at 1346. 
243. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, (Sept. 25, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
244. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
245. On rehearing, the Federal Circuit stated: 
The Supreme Court, however, has ... consistently held that § 101, although broad, is 
not unlimited. The Court's precedents provide three judicially created exceptions to 
§ 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: ''Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas" are not patentable. The Court has also referred to those exceptions as 
precluding the patenting of mental processes. 
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1324 (citations omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012». 
246. The Federal Circuit Court utilized the Supreme Court's definition when it stated, 
'''[t]he relevant distinction for purposes of § 101 is ... between products of nature ... and 
human-made inventions.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrbarty, 447 U.S. 
303, 313 (1980». Additionally, the Federal Circuit stated, "[t]he Court has explained that, 
although not required by the statutory text, '[t]he concepts covered by these exceptions are "part 
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men ... free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."'" 
Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010». 
247. The Federal Circuit also reached the same result as to patentability of the claimed 
processes, holding those which resulted in a transformed compound patentable and those which 
merely required observing a correlation not. Id. at 1333-34. 
248. Id. at 1325. 
249. Id. 
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court then devoted a significant amount of effort explaining the 
differences between the claimed isolated sequence and the naturally 
occurring sequence.250 
The dissent read the Supreme Court's decision as compelling 
the conclusion that "[j]ust as a patent involving a law of nature must 
have an 'inventive concept' that does 'significantly more than simply 
describe ... natural relations,' a patent involving a product of nature 
should have an inventive concept that involves more than merely 
incidental changes to the naturally occurring product."251 The dissent 
also criticized the majority's decision as granting overly broad 
protection, and thereby threatening to foreclose more innovation than 
is justified under the statute. 252 
At a minimum, the opinions on remand demonstrate that the 
Supreme Court's current subject-matter test is not sufficiently clear to 
the Federal Circuit to produce a unanimous opinion in a case that the 
Supreme Court had just itself decided by a unanimous opinion. This 
is not merely an academic "discussion" between the courts. On the 
contrary; the uncertainty as to what can be protected and what cannot 
has an impact on investment decisions, and therefore has a 
corresponding impact on decisions as to which technologies are 
investigated and developed and which remain unexplored. This 
uncertainty and its results might be an acceptable cost to society if 
there were a countervailing benefit to society. It is therefore fair to 
ask why the courts perceive a need to intervene on the definition of 
statutory subject matter, and whether these perceived needs establish 
such a benefit. 
The remainder of the Article will explore both the judiciary's 
substantive motivation behind such intervention-that is, whether 
and to what extent the courts truly believe some government actor 
should make a change-and whether the judiciary is the proper 
branch of government to do so. 
250. Id. at 1325·33. 
251. Id. at 1355 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294, 1297 (2012». 
252. The dissent does not think Myriad deserves such broad protection. Id. at 1356 
(Bryson, J., dissenting) (considering "'how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the 
contribution of the inventor' and warning of the 'danger' that overly broad patent claims might 
'forecloseD more future invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify"' 
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1301, 1303 
(2012))). 
2012] PATENTS 101 37 
II. WHY JUDICIAL INTEREST IN STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER? 
As discussed above,253 Congress has both the power and a 
rational basis for deciding that it is appropriate to limit patent 
protection to certain categories of invention. In dividing the 
patentable from the unpatentable, the Constitution does not require 
optimality, merely a system that Congress designs to promote 
technological progress through the incentive of a limited-term 
monopoly.254 
The power to fashion such a system is committed to Congress255 
and exercised by Congress in Title 35 of the US Code.256 While others 
might have selected a different balance, the system Congress created 
certainly promotes progress through the limited-term monopoly 
incentive it offers.257 Congress has established 
technology-neutral restrictions on patentable subject matter and has 
also shown itself capable of providing technology-specific exceptions 
when it chooses to do SO.258 
Once Congress has expressed its choice in the statute, the 
courts have the power to interpret ambiguous statutes and to 
determine the constitutionality of statutes. 259 Given the various 
sections of the patent statute that are designed to protect the public 
domain and promote progress,260 and given the clarity and consistency 
of Congress's definition of statutory subject matter,261 what judicial 
concerns motivate the need to engraft imitations on the broad 
statutory definition? The following concerns emerge from the cases. 
253. See supra Part I.A. 
254. See supra Part LA. 
255. U.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). 
256. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (2006). 
257. See Patent, LEGAL INFO. INST., (Aug. 19, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://www.law.comell. 
edu/wexlpatent. 
258. Tax strategy patents and claims "directed to or encompassing a human organism" 
are specifically excluded from patentability. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284, 327-28 (20l1) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101). Nuclear weapons 
technology is likewise excluded from patentability. 42 U.S.C. § 2181. In addition, Congress has 
denied remedies for infringement of medical procedure patents. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1). 
259. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). 
260. The statute requires novelty, 35 U.S.C § 102, and non-obviousness, 35 U.S.C § 103, 
as well as enabling disclosure, 35 U.S.C §§ l11-l12, and utility, 35 U.S.C § 101, as prerequisites 
for patentability. 
261. The statutory provisions covering patentable subject matter have remained 
substantively constant from 1790 through the major overhaul of the statute in 2011. See Part 
I.B, supra. 
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A. To Preclude Patents on "Big Ideas" 
The theory underlying the Funk and Benson cases appears to 
be that some ideas (i.e., principles of nature) are so far-reaching that 
patent law cannot allow inventors to monopolize them.262 The 
rationale finds its most coherent expression in Justice Breyer's dissent 
to the dismissal of certiorari in Labcorp.263 
Justice Breyer explains that the problem is not that laws of 
nature are easy, inexpensive, or obvious to discover, but rather that 
allowing them to be patented grants too much protection and thereby 
impedes the exchange of information and discourages research.264 
There are two problems with Justice Breyer's rationale. First, 
it misunderstands the nature of a US patent. Patents are granted 
only for innovations to which the public did not already have access265 
and to which the public would be unlikely to obtain access but for the 
disclosure by the patent applicant.266 As the Supreme Court noted in 
1933 in Dubilier: 
Though often so characterized a patent is not, accurately speaking, a monopoly, for it is 
not created by the executive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the 
community except the grantee of the patent. The term "monopoly" connotes the giving 
of an exclusive privilege for buying, selling, working, or using a thing which the public 
freely enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from the people. An 
inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives 
something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge. 267 
262. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67·68 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
263. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) 
264. The dissent also noted: 
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that "laws of nature" are 
obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary, 
research into such matters may be costly and time·consuming; monetary incentives 
may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of great 
benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too 
much patent protection can impede rather than "promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts," the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. 
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research by 
providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage 
research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing 
researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct 
costly and time·consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring 
complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented 
information, sometimes prohibitively so. 
Id. at 126·27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
265. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
266. [d. § 103. 
267. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (footnote 
omitted). 
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The inventor takes nothing from the public. In fact, by accepting a 
patent, the inventor adds to public knowledge: 
He may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its 
disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted .... 
[U]pon the expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures to the people, 
who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use. 268 
Second, this rationale is extraordinarily bad policy. The 
greater the discovery, the greater the value derived from its 
disclosure. Since a patent may claim only what the inventor has 
discovered and can teach others how to make and use,269 disclosure of 
a "big idea" does not "imped[e] the free exchange of information,"27o 
but rather provides the starting point for others to investigate, 
foreclosing them only from what the inventor can already explain how 
to do. 
Holding that "[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, 
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not 
patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work" presumes a fixed and ascertainable distinction between basic 
tools and other tools, a distinction that clearly depends on the state of 
technology and changes over time.271 An eighteenth-century 
researcher would not have considered quantum theory a "basic 
tool."272 A twenty-first-century researcher would, but only because an 
intervening inventor uncovered, developed, and disclosed the 
information that made it a "basic tool."273 The fundamental theory of 
patent law is that the reward of a limited-term monopoly encourages 
disclosure of what might otherwise be kept secret.274 Denying that 
reward might discourage disclosure, thereby leaving a "fundamental 
tool" unknown and unexploited by future scientists.275 Likewise, 
discoveries would not become "part of the storehouse of knowledge" 
unless a discoverer decided to disclose them.276 
268. Id. at 186-87. 
269. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
270. A patent only precludes manufacture, use, sale or importation-not thought or 
discussion. See id. § 271. 
271. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
272. See generally MAx PLANCK, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUANTUM 
THEORY 1 (Ludwik Silberstein & Hans Thacher Clarke, trans., Oxford at the Clarendon Press 
1922). 
273. Id. 
274. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
275. See id. 
276. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patents Are Property: A Fundamental But Important 
Concept, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 87, 93 (2009). 
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B. To Prevent Premature Patent Monopolies 
A closely related concern is that patents may be granted to 
incompletely developed ideas, foreclosing further development during 
the term of the patent.277 As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent 
in Labcorp, finding the right balance between incentive and 
overprotection is important in order to avoid stifling innovation. 278 
Again, there are two flaws in this rationale. First, while it is 
true that finding the correct balance is important, the Constitution 
commits the responsibility of finding that balance to Congress. 279 
Second, Congress has already struck such a balance: 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 
and 112.280 If an inventor has grasped only the scientific principle, but 
not a specific use, the 35 U.S.C. § 101 utility requirement will preclude 
patentability.281 If an inventor has appreciated only part of the 
implications of a new discovery, the 35 U.S.C. § 112 requirement that 
claims must be commensurate with the inventor's disclosure will limit 
the scope of the patent-the inventor will obtain patent protection 
only for what is in hand as evidenced by an enabling written 
description.282 
C. To Prevent Withdrawing "Things that 'Everybody' Knows" from the 
Public Domain 
The Federal Circuit decision in Alappat reflects an approach, 
since discredited, that treats mathematical algorithms and laws of 
nature as generally known, and it looks to see if anything patentable 
remains once the court removes these publicly known elements from 
the claims.283 The Supreme Court has rejected this approach, 
cautioning against dissecting claims which should be treated as a 
whole. 284 Furthermore, Congress has provided a better tool for 
protecting the public domain: 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, which deny 
patentability to claims that are not new, or which are obvious 
advances over what the public already possesses.285 
277. See Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 106. 
278. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. 548 US 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
279. See David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 96, 97 (2010). 
280. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006). 
28l. Id. § 1Ol. 
282. Id. § 112. 
283. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
284. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 
285. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. 
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D. To Promote Efficiency in the Patent Office's Evaluation of 
Applications 
41 
The Patent Office is charged with evaluating applications to 
ensure that they meet all of the requirements of the statute before 
they are issued as US patents. 286 Joshua Sarnoff argues that applying 
§ 101 exceptions as a threshold requirement will reduce 
administrative costs and the overall burden on the patent system. 287 
Michael Risch argues that "abandoning subject matter restrictions in 
favor of rigorous application of patentability requirements will not 
necessarily lead to more patents in controversial areas."288 
To be sure, some of the statutory requirements are more 
difficult and time-consuming to evaluate than others. For example, 
the 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 requirements can be tested only by first 
establishing the state of the art, an often time-consuming exercise, 
and one which cannot be done with complete assurance.289 The patent 
examiner may miss a publicly available document-for example, it 
may be written in a foreign language or available only from an obscure 
source. The difficulty of evaluation and risk of oversight is arguably 
greater with respect to emerging technologies because the literature is 
less organized, and much of it may still be unpublished. 290 Thus, one 
might argue, excluding broad categories of early-stage inventions 
would save the Patent Office time, and reduce the risk of granting a 
patent that ultimately turns out to be invalid.291 It would, however, do 
so at the cost of removing the incentive of a patent from broad areas of 
mqUIry. 
Moreover, while the efficiency argument may have theoretical 
appeal, it does not reflect the manner in which the Patent Office 
actually operates, nor does it provide additional efficiencies in 
litigation. 292 Under its rules, the Patent Office instructs examiners to 
286. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 702 (8th ed. rev. 8, 2010). 
287. Sarnoff, supra note 19, at 106. 
288. Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 595 (2008). 
289. 35 U.S.C §§ 102, 103; see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2121-214l. 
290. Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments on Issues Related to the 
Identification of Prior Art During the Examination of a Patent Application, 64 Fed. Reg. 28,803, 
28,804 (May 27,1999). 
291. An issued patent is presumed valid, but if it can be shown that the patent was 
issued because the examiner was unaware of a relevant prior art document the presumption can 
be overcome and the patent invalidated. See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 
7 (1934). 
292. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2106. 
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begin the substantive review of an application with an examination of 
the prior art, not with an evaluation of patentable subject matter.293 
Under current "compact prosecution" practice, examiners are 
instructed to consider all obstacles to patentability in the first 
substantive response to the applicant. 294 
Likewise, since a patent claim is invalid if it fails to meet any 
one of the statutory requirements, a court is free to choose which 
statutory barrier to focus on first and, having found one that bars 
patentability, is free to stop its analysis at that point.295 
Thus, unless the Patent Office also changes its practices, 
imposing additional statutory subject-matter requirements beyond 
those Congress has already set would not increase efficiency, either at 
the Patent Office or in the courts. 
III. JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
Judge Rader, dissenting in Bilski, raises a critical question: 
With all of its legal sophistry, the [Federal Circuit] court's new test for eligibility today 
does not answer the most fundamental question of all: why would the expansive 
language of section 101 preclude protection of innovation simply because it is not 
transformational or properly linked to a machine (whatever that means)? Stated even 
more simply, why should some categories of invention deserve no protection?296 
There are two possible approaches to answering this question, 
two types of justifications for judicial introduction of exceptions to the 
statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101: (1) either the statute is 
ambiguous and requires interpretation; or (2) the statute, although 
clear, must be limited as a matter of constitutional law. The 
justification matters: if it is constitutionally mandated, then Congress 
is without power to make a contrary policy judgment; if it is merely a 
matter of statutory interpretation, then if Congress concludes that a 
different interpretation is preferable, Congress (and most 
appropriately Congress) can adjust the language to further the policy 
it desires. 297 
A. Statutory Command 
The language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 does not appear ambiguous on 
its face. It lists four categories of statutory subject matter and does 
not exclude "phenomena of nature, mental processes, or abstract 
293. See id. 
294. See id. 
295. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-104 (2006). 
296. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
297. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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intellectual concepts."298 Congress has apparently had no difficulty 
excluding specific types of inventions that would otherwise fit within 
the four broad statutory categories and has done so most recently in 
the 2011 America Invents Act. 299 The Supreme Court cautioned in 
Dubilier,30o and repeated in Chakrabarty, that courts "should not read 
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature 
has not expressed."301 In Chakrabarty, the Court explained its role as 
follows: 
Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable subject matter in 
§ 101; we perform ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so doing, 
our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the 
legislative history and statutory purpose.302 
In a concurring opinion in Arrhythmia Research, Judge Rader 
observed that, in Benson, the Supreme Court read into 35 U.S.C. § 101 
"a limitation not found in the statute," noting no fewer than four times 
that the limitation cannot be found in, or reasonably inferred from, 
the statutory language.303 
The Supreme Court cases provide no argument that the terms 
"machine," "manufacture," "composition of matter," or "process" are 
ambiguous. 304 In fact, in reviewing the changes over the more than 
two-hundred-year history of the statute, the Court has found a 
consistency in the meaning of these terms.305 If there is a justification 
for judicial intervention, then it must arIse as a matter of 
Constitutional necessity. 
298. 35 U.S.C. § 10l. 
299. Leahy·Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112·29, §§ 14, 33, 125 Stat. 284, 
327·28 (2011) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 101) (declaring tax strategies within the prior art and 
thereby excluding them from patentability and declaring human organisms unpatentable). 
300. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933). 
301. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
302. ld. at 315. 
303. Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix, 958 F.2d 1053, 1061·62 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(Rader, J., concurring). The court wrote: 
ld. 
[1] The language of section 101 conveys no implication that the Act extends patent 
protection to some subcategories of machines or processes and not to others. [2] The 
limits on patentable subject matter within section 101 focus not on subcategories of 
machines or processes, but on characteristics, such as newness and usefulness. . .. 
[3] [Tlhe language of the Patent Act does not suggest that the words "machine" or 
"process" carry limitations outside their ordinary meaning .... [4] Rather the Act, by 
its terms, extends patent protection to "any" machine or process which satisfies the 
other conditions of patentability. 
304. See e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303; Dubilier 289 U.S. at 178; Arrhythmia, 958 
F.2d at 1053. 
305. See discussion of statutory history, supra Part LA 
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B. Constitutional Requirement 
If there is an underlying constitutional mandate that 
"phenomena of nature, mental processes, or abstract intellectual 
concepts" must be excluded from the reach of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the 
Supreme Court has not articulated it.306 
While never explicitly called upon to rule on the 
constitutionality of § 101, the Court has frequently commented on the 
section without expressing any doubt as to its constitutionality. As 
early as McClurg v. Kingsland, the Court held that "the powers of 
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the 
terms of the Constitution."307 The statement in Chakrabarty that 
"Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable 
subject matter in § 101" certainly suggests that there is no 
constitutional requirement to modify the language of the statute. 308 
The statement in Labcorp that "the reason for the exclusion is that 
sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than 
'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,''' after conceding 
that "research into such matters may be costly and 
time-consuming .... and that research may prove of great benefit to 
the human race," is a criticism of line-drawing, rather than a 
constitutional shortcoming.309 The Constitution charges Congress 
with promoting progress, not finding a hypothetical optimal point of 
promotion.310 
IV. POLICY 
The extensive history of the inconstancy of judicial exclusions 
from the clear statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the difficulty 
of the lower courts in interpreting the exclusions are powerful 
arguments that such judicial intervention is unwise. The uncertainty 
created by this interference with Congress's policy determination 
raises costs to participants and to society in general. It raises both 
processing costs at the patent prosecution stage and costs of litigation 
necessitated by uncertainty. It also raises costs to society, which, 
although unquantifiable, are also undeniable; uncertainty discourages 
306. See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843); see also Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 315. 
307. McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206. 
308. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315. 
309. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
310. See U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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investment in all emerging technologies, including those technologies 
of greatest potential value.311 
The fact that neither the Federal Circuit nor even some 
members of the Supreme Court can fathom the limits of patentable 
subject matter should be motivation enough to put an end to judicial 
intervention.312 The Court has had to address the issue of statutory 
subject matter directly313 and tangentially314 more than a dozen times 
and has never been able to reach a unanimous decision. 315 
Admittedly, some parties may benefit from ambiguity. To the 
extent that there is doubt as to the availability of patent protection, 
some inventors will be motivated to forego the cost and effort of 
applying for a patent.316 To the extent that there is doubt as to the 
validity of a patent, some patentees will be motivated to forego the 
cost and effort of infringement litigation. Thus, some infringers will, 
in fact, benefit from ambiguity at the expense of inventors and 
patentees. These are not, however, the parties whose interests the 
Constitution charges Congress to "promote" in Article I, Section 8.317 
The recent Golan case might suggest otherwise. In justifying 
the extension of copyright protection to public domain works, Justice 
Ginsburg noted that motivating creation of works of authorship was 
not the sole goal of the Intellectual Property Clause. "Evidence from 
the founding, moreover, suggests that inducing dissemination-as 
opposed to creation-was viewed as an appropriate means to promote 
science."318 
311. See Jonathan Levin & Richard Levin, Benefits and Costs of an Opposition Process, 
in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE·BASED ECONOMY 120, 122 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. 
Merrill eds., 2003). 
312. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
313. See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1853); see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 
3218; Labcorp, 548 U.S. at 124; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Mackay 
Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 
(1891); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881); Rubber·Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 
(1874); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252 (1853); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853). 
314. See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); United States v. Dubilier 
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933). 
315. See supra note 313. 
316. Foregoing patent protection will usually mean maintaining trade secrecy, imposing 
a cost on society. See generally, e.g., Shawn McDonald, Patenting Floppy Disks, or How the 
Federal Circuit's Acquiescence Has Filled the Void Left by Legislative Inaction, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
9 (1998) (discussing that during a period when patentability of software inventions was 
uncertain, software inventors chose trade secrecy or copyright protection-which permitted 
preservation oftrade secrets-rather than risk applying for patents). 
317. See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
318. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012). Note, however, that this argument 
related to the dissemination of ideas through publication of copyrightable works, not 
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In fact, the very argument that judicial exceptions are 
necessary to prevent monopolization of emerging technologies proves 
the opposite-without the disclosure of the discovery, the field would 
not even exist.319 If the uncertainty introduced by judicial exceptions 
makes financing unavailable, or motivates innovators to look 
elsewhere, then the field will not develop, increasing the cost to society 
more than any conceivable cost that might be imposed by a 
limited-term monopoly.320 Even if innovators still choose to innovate 
without the patent incentive, they will be forced, in the absence of 
patent protection, to rely on trade secret protection instead. 321 This 
will work "against the developers and even society as a whole. Rather 
than promoting information exchange and technological innovation, 
trade secrecy encourages developers to hoard their inventions; this 
forces software developers to 'spend much of their efforts reinventing 
the wheel .... "'322 It would be hard to construct an argument that the 
goal of the Intellectual Property Clause is to encourage secrecy. 
v. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The fundamental problem with the current judicial limitations 
on statutory subject matter is not so much the exclusion or inclusion of 
certain types of inventions, but rather the ambiguity and uncertainty 
which results from judicial intervention in a policy decision. Congress 
should reassert its role as policy maker. 
If Congress concludes that phenomena of nature, mental 
processes and abstract intellectual concepts should not be patentable, 
revising the statute to explicitly exclude these categories from 
patentability would remove a source of ambiguity and improve the 
efficiency of the patent system.323 More importantly, it would return 
dissemination of products incorporating patentable inventions. The function of disseminating 
ideas is served with respect to patents by publication of the patent, which by virtue of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112 must contain enough information to teach how to make and use the invention. See 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
319. See supra Part II.D. 
320. The argument might be made that some other innovator will eventually make the 
same invention. Not only is this speculative, but if it is true that it is likely that someone else 
would come up with the same idea, the invention would probably be unpatentable under the 
obviousness standard of 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
321. See Chad King, Note, Abort, Retry, Fail: Protection for Software·Related Inventions 
in the Wake of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1118, 1157·58 (2000). 
322. Id. at 1159-60 (quoting Lee A. Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need for 
Congressional Action on Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 283,286 (1996». 
323. Congress took just such a step in 1952 when it added § 103 to the patent statute, 
codifying the judicially created principle of rejecting patents on obvious advances. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,3 (1966). 
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the policy decision to the branch to which it was committed by the 
Constitution. 
If Congress concludes that judicial intervention is contrary to 
its policy decision as reflected in the language it chose for 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, it has the power to act. Judicial intervention is not 
constitutionally mandated. While it might seem odd to single out 
certain items as included within what otherwise appears to be a broad 
and open-ended definition, the Supreme Court's foray into patent 
policy makes such a step necessary. A simple statutory 
amendment-adding, for example, the words "including phenomena of 
nature, mental processes, or abstract intellectual concepts which 
otherwise meet the requirements of this statute"-would solve the 
problem. 
Even if Congress concludes that there is no harm at the 
moment, it is difficult to predict how the judicial restrictions might 
affect the development of emerging or future technologies. For 
example, no one would suggest that current machines are products of 
nature-they are too complex and too clearly manmade. As 
nanotechnology develops and the concept of machine approaches the 
molecular scale, the dividing line may become less obvious. 
The impact on currently unforeseen technologies is even harder 
to predict. The risk of a limited-term monopoly would seem less costly 
to society than the risk of the permanent loss of a valuable technology 
because the technology is never developed. Reasonable people could 
disagree on which risk is preferable and where, as a matter of policy, 
Congress should draw the line between the patentable and the 
unpatentable. What seems beyond reasonable disagreement, however, 
is that Congress is the appropriate branch of government to decide the 
policy matter and draw that line. 
